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PATENT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS that involve payments from
brand-name drug manufacturers to generic drug manufacturers (so
called "reverse payments") have recently attracted a great deal of at-
tention from economists, legal scholars, government antitrust enforce-
ment agencies, and the courts.' Some of the agreements are
"complete" settlement agreements, 2 where the brand-name manufac-
turer makes payments to the generic drug companies to completely
settle the patent litigation, with specific agreed-upon entry dates for
the generics. Others involve "partial" or "interim" settlement agree-
ments, where there are payments from patent holders to would-be ge-
neric manufacturers in exchange for the generics not entering the
market before a final resolution of patent litigation. These interim
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Federal Trade Commission.
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1. See, e.g., James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle
Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug
Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (2002); M. Howard Morse, Settlement of Intellectual Prop-
erty Disputes in the Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Industries: Antitrust Rules, 10 GEo. MASON
L. REv. 359 (2002) (including background discussion of the actions by government anti-
trust enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs, the court decisions on this type of case,
and some of the prior research in this area).
2. See, e.g., In reSchering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 FTC LEXIS 187 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/scheringpart3cmp.pdf (last accessed Aug. 17,
2004).
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settlements do not specify a fixed date for generic entry.3 This Article
examines some of the key economic issues presented in the existing
research relating to patent settlements with such payments, and
presents some specific economic tests and analyses relating to the
competitive implications of interim settlement agreements. In particu-
lar, this Article focuses on whether an interim settlement is most likely
related to the patent holder's potential under-compensation for pat-
ent damages and tests that explanation against the potential for such
an agreement to be anticompetitve. An interim agreement is most
likely procompetitive and pro-consumer under the following circum-
stances, which typically can be tested from observable information in a
case where under-compensation is an issue:
* The payments from the brand-name manufacturer to the ge-
neric are less than the expected under-compensation.
* The patent holder overall is substantially engaged in research,
development, and promotion.
* The interim settlement agreement is more cost efficient than
formal legal proceedings, such as preliminary injunction or stay
pending appeal, at preventing expected under-compensation.
As a general rule, the vast majority of research about patent settle-
ments with "reverse payments" has focused on complete and interim
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. 4 These "reverse payments"
and the attendant research in the prescription pharmaceutical indus-
try are not surprising, given the industry's unique regulatory require-
3. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Complaint, at 4-5, In re Abbott Labs. & Geneva Pharms., (No.
C-3946) (F.T.C. May 22, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946om
plaint.htm (last accessed Nov. 2, 2004); Plaintiffs' Complaint, Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., (F.T.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (No. 9293), available at http://www.ftc.gov.os/2000/03/hoech
standrxcomplaint.htm (last accessed Nov. 2, 2004); see also Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1,
at 780-82 (discussing the difference between the complete settlement agreements and the
interim settlement agreements, in which interim settlement agreements are called partial
settlement agreements).
4. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal
Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491 (2002); Thomas Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settle-
ments Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some
Recent Scholarship, 71 kNTITRUsT L.J. 1069 (2004) [hereinafter Cotter, Antitrust Implications];
Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1719 (2003) [hereinafter Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement]; Langenfeld
& Li, supra note 1; Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment
Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST LJ. 1033, 1033-68 (2004); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Set-
tlements, 34 RAND J. EcoN. 391, 407-08 (2003) [hereinafter Shapiro, Antitrust Limits]; Jer-
emy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 4 (May 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors); Keith Leffler & Cris Leffler, Patent Litigation Settle-
ments: Payments by the Patent Holder Are Anticompetitive and Should Be Per Se Illegal, REs. L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2004), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/kleffler/Research.
html (last accessed Nov. 2, 2004); Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy To-
wards Agreements That Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2004).
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ments and, in particular, the regulations embedded in the Hatch-
Waxman Act 5 and the Federal Trade Commission investigations
targeting it.
The economics of these agreements can be complex, and vary by
the specific type of agreement and the facts of each case. As this Arti-
cle discusses, there is general agreement that analyzing the impact of
any particular settlement should take as a starting point the trade-off
between short-run price and long-run innovation competition as opti-
mally determined by the existing patent and competition laws and the
statutes of the Hatch-Waxman Act. However, even starting from the
same point, there is disagreement over exactly how to model these
settlements and whether they are, on balance, anticompetitive or im-
prove overall consumer welfare.
Most economists use probabilistic game theory models to analyze
these settlements, 6 but some commentators believe such an approach
is not appropriate because of its complexity and the potential
problems with developing clear and reliable tests. 7 To see why the
analysis is complex, consider agreements that completely settle patent
disputes. These agreements, in general, fix a date for generic entry
that is before the expiration of the patent. However, since the out-
come of patent litigation is uncertain and a generic may be bluffing
about entering the market, one cannot pinpoint a date when entry
would have taken place absent the agreement. Accordingly, most
economists look at entry "but for" the settlement by assigning a
probability to the date when entry would have occurred absent the
agreement and use the "expected value" of that date as an estimate of
the specific date of entry. They then compare that expected entry date
to the date in the settlement to determine the impact of the agree-
ment on short-run price competition. Some then look to the strength
of the patent and proxies for that strength, such as the size of the
"reverse payment," to infer the impact on the consumer welfare. 8
However, the specific terms of a settlement and specific facts
about the market will greatly affect the impact of an agreement on the
5. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). For a discussion of the relevant aspects of
the Hatch-Waxman Acts, see, for example, Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 778-80.
6. See, e.g., Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 4; Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at
3-17; Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent Settlements Between Rivals, 17 ANTrITRUsT 70,
70-76 (2003) [hereinafter Shapiro, Settlements Between Rivals]; Willig & Bigelow, supra note
4.
7. See, e.g., Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On
"Probabilistic" Patent Rights and False Positives, 17 ANTITRUST 68 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Shapiro, Settlements Between Rivals, supra note 6, at 71-72.
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firms involved and on consumers in the long run. As we have shown
previously, if banning patent settlement agreements such as ones that
involve "reverse payments" deters the probability of a new product
coming out by as little as thirty percent, then consumer welfare will
likely be reduced.9 Accordingly, these cases do not lend themselves to
overbroad generalizations and should not be condemned as per se
illegal or virtually per se illegal.10 Instead, there needs to be specific,
measurable, and economically sound tests for each type of case and
fact pattern. As discussed above, this Article provides examples of
some specific measurable tests for one type of case and fact pattern,
which is when interim settlements with payments from a patent holder
to a would-be generic entrant can and cannot be justified by the po-
tential for under-compensation to the patent holder. Similar tests that
address the specific settlements and market facts can and should be
developed to evaluate accurately the implications of each type of pat-
ent settlements with "reverse payments."
I. Existing Research on Patent Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical Industry with "Reverse Payments"
Research on the implications of patent settlements in the phar-
maceutical industry with "reverse payment" is relatively recent.11 Such
research has been spurred, at least in part, by certain Federal Trade
Commission challenges to such agreements that have led to litigation
and consents between the FTC and the parties involved. 12 The vast
9. Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 803-04.
10. Simplistic arguments, such as forcing firms to choose what might be perceived as
potentially less anticompetitive patent-dispute settlements make no sense in this context.
For example, some have suggested allowing royalty payments from the generic to the pat-
ent holder, but argue that complete and interim settlement agreements with "reverse pay-
ments" should be banned. See, e.g., Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at 1, 8-10, 24. However,
royalty agreements can have exactly the same implications for short run consumer welfare
as agreements with "reverse payment," since a royalty rate could be set sufficiently high that
prices would not fall in the short run-even with entry of the licensee.
11. For an encyclopedic list of the various articles, see Cotter, Antitrust Implications,
supra note 4. The earliest of the articles he lists was published in 2001. Id. at 1069 n.1.
12. The FTC has brought complaints against Abbott Laboratories and Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Plaintiffs' Complaint, In re Abbott Labs. & Geneva Pharms., (F.T.C.
2000) (No. C-3946), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946omplaint.htm (last
accessed Nov. 2, 2004); Plaintiffs' Complaint, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., (F.T.C. 2000)
(No. 9293), available at http://www.ftc.gov.os/2000/03/hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm (last
accessed Nov. 2, 2004); In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2003 FTC LEXIS 187 (2001). Some of
the private cases include In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d
1340 (S.D. Fla. 2000), and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D.
Mich. 2000). For an example of the consent agreement reached between the FTC and the
parties involved in the patent settlement with "reverse payment," see United States of
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majority of the articles are by attorneys, and the rest are by econo-
mists. Although some of the research attempts to apply certain eco-
nomic principals to all such cases, many of the actual economic issues
depend on the specific nature of the settlement-such as whether the
agreement is a complete or interim settlement.1 3
Consider some of the differences in complete versus interim set-
dements. In complete settlements there can be litigation cost savings,
since this type of agreement presumably terminates costly court pro-
ceedings earlier. For interim settlements, litigation cost savings are
presumably smaller, because the litigation continues as it would with-
out the settlement. 14 Moreover, complete settlements with a negoti-
ated generic entry date likely lead to a different entry date than would
occur with litigation absent the agreement. For interim settlements
this may not be the case. The litigation continues with or without an
interim settlement, and the potential patent damages for a would-be
generic entrant will often deter its entry until the litigation is re-
solved-even though a would-be entrant may be able to credibly
threaten a patent holder with earlier entry.1 5
The economic research typically applies probabilistic models of
entry dates, as discussed above, and then predicts the impact on con-
sumer welfare of a complete settlement to what would happen absent
the agreement. Most economists recognize there is a trade-off in con-
sumer welfare between short-run competition ("static efficiency") and
long-run benefits of encouraging firms to compete to develop new
products that benefit consumers ("dynamic efficiency") .16 They take
America Before Federal Trade Commission, In re Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Decision
and Order, (F.T.C. 2000) (No. C-3946), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c39
46.do.htm (last accessed Nov. 2, 2004). In the consent agreement, Geneva agreed not to
enter similar interim settlement agreements in the future unless it receives a court's ap-
proval and notifies the FTC. Id. § III.
13. Most of the literature specifically analyzes complete settlement agreements, al-
though some of the principles discussed in this research may apply to other patent settle-
ments. Accordingly, the economic analysis of complete settlements is discussed in this
section, realizing that there are typically important fact-specific inquiries and economic
issues that are unique to any agreement. The other sections of this Article examine interim
settlements and one particularly important aspect of evaluating this type of settlement-
the potential for a generic under compensating a patent holder for infringement damages.
14. See Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of
Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87
MINN. L. REv. 1789, 1806 (2003) [hereinafter Cotter, Refining the Presumptive Illegality].
15. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 4, at 523; Shapiro, Settlements Between Rivals,
supra note 6, at 74; Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 790.
16. See, e.g., Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 786-90; Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4,
at 17; Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 4, at 396.
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the existing patent laws, antitrust laws, and the Hatch-Waxman Act as
having established the optimal trade-off.17 However, much of the liter-
ature applied to complete settlements, in effect, focuses on changes in
short-run competition.18
The articles typically assume generic entry would drive prices
down in some drug markets, 19 and that earlier generic entry would
reduce the costs to consumers. They also assume that the patent
holder without generic competition will receive substantially larger
profits (or rents from the innovation) than the sum of the profits the
patent holder and generic would receive after generic entry, due to a
drop in price. 20 Accordingly, there is an incentive for a patent holder
and generic to reach an agreement to divide the potentially larger
profits without generic entry, but this depends on many other factors.
These factors include the likelihood that the patent holder will prevail
in its patent litigation against the generic and the relative profits for
each firm with and without entry.
By focusing primarily on the short-run competitive issues, the
literature tends to analyze whether a complete settlement would
change the generic's expected entry date. If a settlement would delay
the expected entry date beyond what would be expected without the
agreement, then the agreement might, be seen as a temporal market
allocation-dividing the time remaining on a patent and extending
the patent holder's market power in the short run.
Some of the articles then argue that the existence of payments
from a patent holder to a would-be generic entrant provides substan-
tial evidence that entry would be delayed by the agreement. 21 In ef-
fect, the argument is that there must have been an offsetting
consideration for the payment from the patent holder to the generic
challenger, and that consideration would likely have been the generic
17. See, e.g., Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 788; Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at
17-19.
18. See. e.g., Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at 17. Leffler and Leffler recognize that
complete settlements can affect dynamic efficiency, but they argue that complete settle-
ments are beyond the patent rights granted to patent holders by Congress. Id. at 17-21.
For a similar discussion, see Shapiro, Settlements Between Rivals, supra note 6, at 73.
19. Market definition and market power are typically hotly debated in the cases. For
the purpose of this Article, those issues are not addressed.
20. See, e.g., Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at 4-6; Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note
4, at 407.
21. For example, Shapiro states that the strength of the patent is key to any analysis of
whether a settlement harms consumers, and he argues that large payments from a patent
holder to a generic implies that the patent is weak. See Shapiro, Settlements Between Rivals,
supra note 6, at 71-72.
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deferring its entry beyond the date that would have resulted from a
reasonable litigation compromise. Such a delay would result in lower
consumer surplus in the short run.
Other authors dispute this logic. 22 These authors argue that
agreements with cash payments from a patent holder to a generic can
save litigation and other costs, reduce uncertainty for risk adverse
firms, and eliminate asymmetric information about the value of the
patent. 23 They show complete settlements with payments from a pat-
ent holder to a generic could actually lead to earlier entry by the ge-
neric. 24 For example, these authors argue that settlement negotiations
can be expected to break down frequently under the conditions the
authors outline, and these breakdowns can result in a later expected
generic entry date than the date that would result from a complete
settlement with payments from the patent holder to the generic.25
The policy recommendations relating to complete settlement
with payments from the patent holder to the generic tend to fall into
three categories. Some argue that such treatments should be per se
illegal if they involve a payment from the patent holder to a generic. 26
Another group in effect argues that these payments should create a
presumption of anticompetitive behavior, although the degree of this
presumption may vary by author.27 The final group believes that these
settlements should be analyzed under a full rule of reason, taking into
consideration competitive effects and efficiencies from any such
agreement. 28 In its Matter of Schering-Plough Corp.29 decision, the Fed-
22. See Willig & Bigelow, supra note 4; Schildkraut, supra note 4, at 1033-68.
23. See Schildkraut, supra note 4, at 1057-67.
24. Id. at 1059-60.
25. See id. at 1057-60. A patent holder will be willing to accept entry date earlier than
the expected entry date under litigation if the patent holder is risk averse. However, a
negotiation without reverse payment may still breakdown if, for example, the generic is
cash strapped, or is too optimistic about its chance of winning the patent litigation. As a
result, the generic wants to enter earlier than the entry dates that are acceptable for the
patent holder. A payment from the patent holder to the generic can help bridge the gap
between the acceptable entry dates for the generic and the acceptable entry dates for the
patent holder and lead to generic entry earlier than that expected under litigation. See id.
26. See, e.g., Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at 2-3, 17.
27. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 4, at 534-38; Bulow, supra note 4, at 1; Cotter,
Antitrust Implications, supra note 4, at 1090-94; Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement,
supra note 4; Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceu-
tical Exclusion Payments, 88 MINN. L. Riv. 712 (2004) [hereinafter Hovenkamp et al., Balanc-
ing Ease]; Shapiro, Settlements Between Rivals, supra note 6, at 72.
28. The "rule of reason" approach determines whether the agreement is procompeti-
tive by weighing procompetitive effects of an agreement against the anticompetitive effects.
See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 4, at 533-34; Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement
of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. Rav. 747
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eral Trade Commission chose a rule of reason approach, although it
did place great weight on the size of the payments to the generics 30
and may have left open the door for it to take a different approach in
the future. 31
As can be seen from this discussion, there is a great deal of litera-
ture and varying policy recommendations on complete settlements.
There is less research on interim settlements, and we devote the bal-
ance of this Article to explaining and developing specific economic
tests that address when interim agreements are likely to be procompe-
titive and when they are not.
II. The Implementation of an Economic Test to Determine
Whether an Interim Agreement Is Procompetitive
Although the research specifically addressing interim settlements
is more limited, some of the basic issues raised in the context of com-
plete settlements may have relevance for interim settlements. For ex-
ample, Professor Shapiro proposes a general standard for evaluating
patent agreements, arguing that these agreements should not lead to
outcomes where consumer welfare is lower than that under ongoing
litigation.3 2 He applies that general standard to various types of poten-
tial antitrust cases, such as complete settlement agreements with "re-
verse payments." 33
Some commentators have specifically discussed interim agree-
ments, but few have presented formal models. Blair and Cotter con-
clude that interim agreements should not be treated as per se illegal
for at least two reasons. 34 First, they reason that the courts do not have
sufficient experience in analyzing the effects on competition of this
type of agreement and therefore lack the empirical foundation for
treating these agreements on a per se basis.3 5 Second, Blair and Cotter
point out that the generic may not be able to pay the full damages if it
(2002); Willig & Bigelow, supra note 4; Schlidkraut, supra note 4. Schildkraut even suggests
there is a case for per se legality of these agreements if they arguably fit within the scope of
the patent. Id. at 1035.
29. 2003 FTC LEXIS 187 (2001).
30. See id. 11 7, 25-29, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/scheringpart3c
mp.pdf (last accessed Aug. 17, 2004).
31. Id. 29.
32. Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 4, at 396.
33. Id. at 407-08.
34. Blair & Cotter, supra note 4, at 527; see also Cotter, Refining the Presumptive Illegality,
supra note 14, at 1807.
35. Blair & Cotter, supra note 4, at 527-28.
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enters the market and is found guilty of patent infringement. 36 There-
fore, the authors contend that " [i]f the agreements reflect a legitimate
effort to protect the returns on a patented product from an infringing
rival, this will be pro-competitive as it promotes R&D [research and
development], which confers broad social benefits."37 The authors
prefer using a traditional rule of reason analysis or a so called "quick-
look approach. '38
Leffler and Leffler, on the other hand, hold the view that interim
agreements are anticompetitive in virtually all cases. 39 According to
these authors, the only interesting case concerning interim agree-
ments is when the generic otherwise would have entered the market.
They then infer that "[i]n this situation, the challenger expects that
the profits from entry (including litigation cost) will exceed the dam-
ages if the patent is found valid[,]" 40 and interim agreements are no
different in effect than complete agreements. 41 These authors also ar-
gue that an interim agreement is similar to a "procedural rule grant-
ing patent holders a right to pre-trial exclusion without meeting the
standard preliminary injunction rules .... -42 They therefore contend
that these agreements provide "a greater reward to patent holders
than Congress in fact granted. '43
We have also contributed to this discussion and generated spe-
cific tests to measure when an interim agreement with "reverse pay-
ments" is likely to benefit consumers. 44 Consistent with most
researchers of either complete or interim settlement agreements, we
started our evaluation with the presumption that patent and antitrust
laws at any point in time strike an optimal balance between ensuring
long-run competition ("dynamic efficiency") and short-run competi-
36. Id. at 524-25.
37. Id. at 529.
38. See id. at 532-38.
39. Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at 1, 24.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Id. Based on a simulation, Leffler and Leffler conclude that it is only in rare situa-
tions that the existence of complete settlement agreement is necessary for the efficient
settlement of a patent dispute. See id. at 17. However, it is not clear to us whether the
simulation Leffler and Leffler conduct is sensitive to specific assumptions built into the
model and whether the simulation which Leffler and Leffler use to study complete agree-
ments can be applied to analyze the interim agreements as well.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. As discussed by Langenfeld and Li and later in this Article, interim agreements
are not necessarily beyond the scope of patent holders' patent rights.
44. Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 794-97.
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tion ("static efficiency") .45 We previously addressed one specific aspect
of interim agreements, showing the circumstances under which an in-
terim settlement agreement can serve the purpose of protecting a pat-
ent holder's patent right by mitigating the risk of under-
compensation. 46 We have also shown that an interim settlement agree-
ment can be procompetitive by providing the appropriate incentive
intended by the patent law for firms to make investment in R&D. We
found if such agreements were treated as per se illegal, it would
weaken patent protection. 47 As a result, a per se treatment of these
types of agreements can reduce R&D investment and other innovative
activities below optimal level and ultimately reduce consumer welfare,
even though there may be a short-term gain in consumer welfare. 48
To assess whether an interim settlement agreement is procompe-
titive or anticompetitive in a "truncated rule of reason" or a full rule
of reason analysis, we developed a specific economic test.4 9 According
to this test,
For the payments from the brand-name to the generic to be con-
sidered competitively neutral or procompetitive, the payments
should be no higher than the expected under-compensation to the
brand-name manufacturer if the generic enters the market. This
expected under-compensation is equal to the amount of under-
compensation multiplied by the probability that the brand-name
manufacturer will prevail in the patent infringement litigation.
On the other hand, if the payments from the brand-name manu-
facturer to the generic are higher than the expected under-com-
pensation, then those payments could be anticompetitive.5 0
45. Id. The presumption that the current laws strike an optimal balance between static
efficiency and dynamic efficiency also appears to be adopted by the FTC when it states that
"antitrust analysis must accept statutes and regulations as they are, and evaluate restraints
in the context of the existing framework." See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2003 FTC
LEXIS 187, at *65 (2001).
46. Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 788, 794-97. Under-compensation for the patent
holder is equal to the profit loss the patent holder would have suffered minus the generic's
ability to pay the damages if the generic had entered the market during patent litigation
and were found guilty of patent infringement later.
Specifically, we address when both parties will find an agreement mutually acceptable,
when the settlement surplus is likely due to potential under-compensation and when it is
exclusively due to higher profits from reduced competition. We do not agree with Leffler
and Leffler that the only interesting case is when a generic would have entered before the
end of litigation. The generic presumably has superior knowledge of its intention and
ability to enter. Accordingly, the generic may easily be in a position to bluff a patent holder
into believing that the generic would enter, when it would not enter until there was a
resolution of the patent dispute.
47. Id. at 788.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 794-97.
50. Id. at 797.
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This test can be written more formally by assuming p is the
probability that the patent holder will prevail in the patent infringe-
ment litigation, D is the amount of under-compensation, and S stands
for the payments from the patent holder to the generic.
(1) If p* D > S, then the payment is consistent with a settlement
that addresses under-compensation and so is competitively neutral
or procompetitive.
(2) If p* D < S, then payments could be anticompetitive.
One way this test can be implemented is by using public data
available at the time of the interim agreement, plus data on the drugs
included in the agreement. For example, assume we have information
on the payments specified in an interim settlement agreement and an
estimation of the under-compensation for the patent holder if the ge-
neric had entered the market during patent litigation. One can infer
the threshold probability of a patent being upheld so that the patent
holder's expected under-compensation is equal to or greater than the
patent holder's expected payments. That is, we solve equation (1) for
the threshold where an interim agreement is competitively neutral
(pt), based on information about the payments and the amount of
under-compensation. 51
(3) p'= S / D
After obtaining this threshold probability, it can be compared to
relevant statistics that provide an objective indication on how likely it
is that the patent holder's patent would be upheld. If the threshold
probability for under-compensation is smaller than the likelihood that
the patent holder's patent would be upheld according to the relevant
statistics, then the expected under-compensation is likely to be greater
than the expected payments. Hence, the interim settlement is likely to
be procompetitive. On the other hand, if the threshold probability for
under-compensation is greater than the likelihood that the patent
holder's patent would be upheld, then the expected under-compensa-
tion is likely to be smaller than the expected payments, and the in-
terim settlement could be anticompetitive.
Based on publicly available information, the interim settlement
agreement between Abbott and Geneva ("Geneva Agreement") may
be used as an example to illustrate this implementation. According to
the Eleventh Circuit description of the Geneva Agreement, 52
51. For a particular case, the potential value of the under-compensation may be ap-
proximated from case specific data.
52. These calculations are provided only as an example and do not dispute or en-
dorse the opinion of the court.
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Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million each month until either
someone else brought a generic terazosin hydrochloride product
to market or Abbott won a favorable decision in the district court
on its infringement claim. If Geneva won in district court, Abbott's
$4.5 million monthly payments would go into escrow pending reso-
lution of the appeal, with the escrowed funds going to the party
prevailing on appeal.5 3
In return, the court's opinion suggested that Geneva agreed not to
enter the market with its generic terazosin during the patent
litigation. 54
To illustrate how to implement the expected under-compensa-
tion versus expected payments test, we focus on a patent holder's ex-
pected under-compensation and expected payments between the
district court decision and the Federal Circuit decision in a situation
similar to what the Eleventh Circuit described above. 55 Let D re-
present the estimated amount of under-compensation for the patent
holder if the generic had entered the market after the district court
decision and were later found liable for patent infringement. Let E
represent the total payments the patent holder made into the escrow
between the district court decision and the Federal Circuit decision.
Define p to be the probability of the patent holder winning the patent
litigation at the Federal Circuit.
Since the patent holder would lose only the escrow if it would
have lost the patent case at the Federal Circuit, the expected pay-
ments made by the patent holder after the district court decision is
equal to S= ((1 - p)*E). The patent holder's expected under-compen-
sation is equal to p* D. Therefore, the threshold probability p' in this
example can be obtained by solving the following equation:
(4) pt* D = (1 - p')*E, or
(5) p'= E/(D + E)
One can obtain from public sources the relevant statistics that
provide information on the likelihood that the Federal Circuit would
reverse the district court decision in cases similar to the patent dispute
between Abbott and Geneva. For example, the Federal Circuit's own
official statistics in 1997 show that the Federal Circuit reversed in
53. Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (lth Cir.
2003).
54. Id. at 1300.
55. The district court hearing Abbott's infringement suit against Geneva ruled on
September 1, 1998 that Abbott's '207 patent was invalid in a summary judgment motion.
See id. at 1301; Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
1999). The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on July 1, 1999. Valley
Drug, 344 F.3d at 1301.
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whole or in part fifty-three percent of the cases from district courts. A
survey of every patent decision rendered by the Federal Circuit be-
tween April 5, 1995 and November 24, 1997 found that the rate of
reversal of claim constructions is 37.3% with respect to the district
court and Court of Federal Claims cases.56 According to a study by
Allison and Lemley, thirty-two percent of pre-trial motions in which
the patent was declared invalid were reversed by the Federal Circuit.57
However, Allison and Lemley point out that the Federal Circuit rever-
sal rates reported in their study are biased downward because they
have excluded remands by the Federal Circuit from their study.58
Therefore, taking into account the bias in the reversal statistics in Al-
lison and Lemley, the relevant reversal rate of district court decisions
in pre-trial motions should be higher than thirty-two percent.
If the threshold probability calculated from equation (5) is lower
than the relevant Federal Circuit reversal rate as suggested by these
statistics, then the evidence indicates that the expected under-com-
pensation is likely to be greater than the expected payments, which
implies the agreement is likely to be procompetitive. On the other
hand, if the threshold probability calculated from equation (5) is
higher than the relevant Federal Circuit reversal rate, the evidence
suggests that the expected under-compensation is likely to be smaller
than the expected payments, which implies the agreement could be
anticompetitive.
III. Evaluation of Interim Settlement Agreements' Impact on
Dynamic Efficiency
We have also shown that dynamic efficiency from introduction of
new drugs can be very significant.5 9 Specifically, our analysis showed
that if there is only a thirty percent probability that an additional new
drug will be deterred for each agreement blocked, a ban on interim
settlement agreements will reduce total consumer welfare even
though earlier generic entry can generate cost savings in the short
56. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
57. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 243 (1998). Because the district court ruled that Abbott's pat-
ent was invalid in a summaryjudgment motion, the relevant Federal Circuit reversal rate is
the reversal rate for pre-trial motions instead of the reversal rate for all trial court findings,
which was also reported by Allison and Lemley. See id. at 241.
58. See id. at 203; John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 745, 748, 758-59 (2000).
59. See Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 803-04.
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run.60 One major reason why interim settlement agreements can be
procompetitive is that they can protect the value of a patent holder's
patent and encourage R&D investment and other innovative activities.
This impact is greater if the patent holder is a research-based firm.
Thus, we suggested that the nature of the patent holder's firm should
be examined in evaluating an interim agreement's impact on con-
sumer welfare. 6 ' This can be done by analyzing the firm's overall
R&D. 62
Making an interim agreement illegal would weaken patent pro-
tection below the optimal level if the patent holder is a research-based
firm that relies on patent protection and if the expected payments to
the generic are smaller than the expected under-compensation of the
patent holder. Consequently, the loss of dynamic efficiency would
likely outweigh the gain from static efficiency, and total consumer wel-
fare is likely to decrease. On the other hand, if the patent holder is
not a research-based firm, "it would be less likely that the patent
holder has engaged in agreements to protect its intellectual property
to enable it to bring out. innovative products that will benefit
consumers."
63
However, caution should be exercised when attempting to use
other criteria for evaluating an interim settlement agreement's effect
on dynamic efficiency. Clearly, adopting economically inappropriate
criteria will lead to incorrect conclusions on how an interim settle-
ment agreement affects dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare.
For example, it may be tempting to compare the ex post profits
the patent holder earned from the patented product before a settle-
ment to the specific R&D cost the patent holder incurred bringing
that product to the market.6 4 Based on this comparison, one might
argue that the larger the profits received by the patent holder prior to
a settlement and the smaller the R&D necessary to obtain the patent,
the smaller the impact from banning the interim settlement agree-
ment on dynamic efficiency. The reasoning, although incorrect,
would be that the patent holder was likely to have collected sufficient
profits prior to the agreement to motivate its efforts to innovate, even
if competition for this product occurred prior to the end of the pat-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 808.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 808-09.
64. Here, "ex post" refers to the time period after the relevant patent has been
invented.
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ent. There are several reasons why this comparison is economically
incorrect in evaluating the settlement's impact on dynamic efficiency.
First, it is economically inappropriate to compare profits from the
sales of a particular drug covered by the patent in dispute to the spe-
cific R&D costs incurred for that drug. Research in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry is similar to drilling for oil. There are many dry holes, and
the small percentage of cases where oil is found must pay for the dry
holes if the search is to continue.
It is important to keep in mind that the development of new
drugs is not only a costly enterprise that involves substantial R&D ex-
penditures, it is also subject to substantial ex ante risk. Pharmaceutical
firms synthesize thousands of chemical compounds for each one that
reaches the market, 65 but only one of four drugs that enter clinical
trials ultimately is approved by the FDA.66 The average time between
the synthesis of a new drug compound and FDA approval is an esti-
mated 14.2 years. 67 According to a study published in the Journal Of
Health Economics, only about thirty percent of drugs that reach the
market produce revenues in excess of average development costs.
68
Because of these substantial risks associated with new drug devel-
opment, it is inappropriate to analyze the profits and R&D expendi-
tures associated with a particular drug in isolation. Instead, a research-
based firm's R&D investment must be viewed as a portfolio. A re-
search-based company makes substantial investment in R&D, knowing
that much of its R&D investment will not generate revenue. These
companies, however, expect that a portion of its R&D efforts will re-
sult in successful new drug development, and the profits generated
from the relatively small number of new drugs can cover the overall
R&D expenditures of the firm. It is the research-based firm's commit-
ment to the overall level of R&D expenditures that determines the like-
lihood of successful new drug development. Absent the overall R&D
efforts, research-based firms may not have brought many successful
drugs to the market, given the substantial risks involved. Therefore,
65. SeeJoseph DiMasi, Trends in Drug Development Costs, Times, and Risks, 29 DRUG INFO.
J. 375, 381 (1995) (and the references cited therein).
66. See W. Kip VIscUSI, JOHN M. VERNON, & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 823 (3d ed. 2000).
67. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2001: A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 17 (2001).
68. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions
in the 19 80s, 13J. HEALTH ECON. 398, 399 fig.5 (1994). The authors compared, on an after-
tax basis, the average net present value of net revenues to the average capitalized value of
R&D cost.
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comparing profits from the sales of the drug covered by the patent in
dispute to the R&D costs associated with that drug does not provide
an economically meaningful measurement of how an interim settle-
ment agreement affects dynamic efficiency.
Second, the patent regime is a forward-looking incentive system,
and therefore it is economically inappropriate to compare the ex post
profits realized from the sales of the product covered by the patent in
dispute to the research and development costs associated with the
product. The patent regime is an incentive system that provides firms
the appropriate incentive to engage in R&D and bring new products
to market. The appropriate incentive provided by the patent regime
depends on the level of patent protection firms expect to receive. A
reduction in the level of patent protection firms expect to receive will
reduce firms' incentive to engage in R&D in the future and to under-
take future innovative activities. As a result, dynamic efficiency de-
creases. Therefore, the patent regime is essentially a forward-looking
incentive system that encourages future R&D investments and future
innovative activities. At any point in time, such as when settlement
agreements occur, the effect of banning such agreements on dynamic
efficiency from that time forward must be considered.
On the other hand, if one only focuses on a particular successful
patented product that has already been introduced, then there is no
real trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies. Once a patent
has been invented and the associated new product has been brought
to the market, the specific dynamic efficiency effects associated with
that patent are in the process of being realized because the product
now exists and consumers are benefiting from that new product. 69 An
ex post approach in effect would allow other firms to free-ride on any
already invented patent that generated profits, hoping that the price
for that product would be reduced and short-run consumer welfare
would be increased from that time forward.
Under this approach, however, innovative firms would have much
less incentive to invest in new products from that time forward, since
these firms may not be able to recoup their investments. That is, if
firms anticipate that their innovative activities will not be protected
once each of their innovations have been accomplished, then not pro-
69. Patent protection can also indirectly affect the extraction of dynamic efficiency
from products that have been introduced to the market, for example, through its impact
on firms' incentive to market and promote the product after launch. For simplicity, this
post product launch effect of patent protection is ignored in the discussion in this section.
Taking into account this effect does not change the nature of the analysis.
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viding patent protection will clearly discourage firms from engaging
in future innovative activities, and this will harm society by reducing
dynamic efficiency from that time forward. In fact, if one were to use
the ex post approach limited to a single patent that has already been
invented, it may be impossible to justify any patent protection.
Accordingly, the trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic
efficiency under the patent regime is a trade-off between current static
inefficiency and expected future dynamic efficiency at a given point of
time and not retrospectively. It is clearly economically incorrect to en-
gage in an ex post analysis limited to a single innovation and the prod-
ucts that contain the specific innovation.
Another criterion that might be erroneously used to evaluate an
agreement's effect on dynamic efficiency involves examining con-
sumer benefits generated from the specific patent in dispute. Such an
approach might assert that the smaller the consumer benefits from
the patent innovation, the smaller any impact on dynamic efficiency
from disallowing the settlement. The intuition behind such an errone-
ous argument would be that an innovation yielding little or no addi-
tional consumer benefit related to the specific patent implied few
dynamic efficiencies, and any static efficiencies from increased short-
run competition would dominate.
However, since the patent regime is a forward-looking incentive
system that encourages future R&D investment and innovative activi-
ties, the trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency is a
trade-off between current static efficiency and future dynamic effi-
ciency. Therefore, it is also economically inappropriate to evaluate
this trade-off by examining the ex post consumer surplus generated
from a given patent that has already been invented. The direct con-
sumer benefit from a given patent that has already been invented may
be small, and it may be zero if the product was not successful. How-
ever, if the level of patent protection is reduced, then it would dis-
courage firms from making future R&D investments that could result
in new patents and new products that can generate significant con-
sumer benefits in the future.
Given our analyses of the appropriate economic tests of when an
interim agreement is likely or unlikely to be procompetitive and pro-
consumer, we now turn to other efficiency implications of interim set-
tlements that relate to when these settlements should be considered
within the scope of patent protection.
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IV. Interim Settlement Agreement Can Be More Cost
Efficient Than Formal Legal Proceedings for a
Patent Holder to Protect Itself from the Risk
of Under-Compensation
One important issue in evaluating the antitrust implications of
interim settlements is whether an interim settlement is within the
scope of a patent holder's patent right. For example, in remanding
the district court's per se ruling of the Geneva Agreement, the Elev-
enth Circuit states,
The effect of the Geneva Agreement on the production of Ge-
neva's infringing generic terazosin product may have been no
broader than the potential exclusionary effect of the '207 patent.
70
* . . When the exclusionary power of a patent is implicated, how-
ever, the antitrust analysis cannot ignore the scope of the patent
exclusion. 7t
The appropriate analysis on remand will likely require an identifi-
cation of the protection afforded by the patents and the relevant
law and consideration of the extent to which the Agreements re-
flect a reasonable implementation of these. 72
We have shown that if the payments from a brand-name manufac-
turer to a generic in an interim settlement agreement are within a
certain range, the interim agreement can protect the patent holder's
patent right by reducing the risk of expected under-compensation.
Therefore, the payments are consistent with being within the scope of
the patent holder's patent right.73 Other researchers have argued to
the contrary. For example, Leffler and Leffler argue that interim set-
tlement agreements exceed the exclusionary potential of patent hold-
ers' patent rights set by the current laws because "the patent holder is
obtaining pre-trial exclusion without meeting the preliminary injunc-
tion criteria of the Federal Rules."'74
70. Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1305 (11th Cir.
2003).
71. Id. at 1310.
72. Id. at 1312 (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit remanded the per se ruling
on the settlement agreement between Abbott and Zenith as well. See id. at 1300-01 for a
discussion of the Abbott/Geneva and Abbott/Zenith Agreements.
73. Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 788, 797.
74. Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at 24 (citation omitted) (also arguing that interim
settlement agreements that do not involve payments from the patent holders to the chal-
lengers should be permitted-see Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at n.43). For a similar
argument, see Shapiro, Settlements Between Rivals, supra note 6, at 73.
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Obtaining preliminary injunctions are costly and they are uncer-
tain, so risk adverse patent holders in particular may find them not to
be the most cost effective way to guard against valid concerns about
under-compensation-even if the patent holder had a high likelihood
of obtaining a preliminary injunction. 75 When the expected costs of
different options to protect a patent holder from the risk of under-
compensation are accounted for, an interim settlement agreement
can be more cost efficient for preventing expected under-compensa-
tion than formal legal proceedings, such as a stay pending appeal. If
an interim settlement agreement is more cost efficient than formal
legal proceedings at preventing expected under-compensation, then
this too suggests that the interim agreement is consistent with it falling
within the scope of a patent holder's patent right.
To compare the costs of patent protection through interim settle-
ments to that of alternative formal legal proceedings, public informa-
tion on the Geneva Agreement may again be used as an example. 76 As
an alternative to reaching the interim settlement agreement with Ge-
neva, Abbott had the option of seeking a stay pending appeal after the
district decision. 77 To illustrate that interim settlement agreements
can be more cost efficient than formal legal proceedings, we analyze
the conditions under which an interim settlement similar to the Ge-
neva Agreement would be more cost efficient than a stay pending
appeal.
First, assume that the patent holder would be under-compen-
sated if the generic had entered the market during patent litigation
and if the patent holder's patent had been found valid later. Figure 1
shows the possible different outcomes if the patent holder seeks a stay
pending appeal and the cost for the patent holder associated with
each outcome. Figure 2 shows the possible different outcomes under
an interim agreement and the cost for the patent holder associated
with each outcome.
75. This can be true even when a patent holder is risk neutral, as modeled below.
76. See discussion supra Part I1 (regarding the Geneva Agreement).
77. As discussed in Langenfeld & Li, supra note 1, at 796, a preliminary injunction
does not eliminate the risk of under-compensation.
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Cost to Patent Holders
Win Appeal 0
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.<p 
Win
2
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The terms in Figure 1 and 2 are defined as follows:
pS: Probability of patent holder obtaining stay pending appeal
p: Probability that the patent holder will prevail in the patent in-
fringement litigation
B: Total amount of bond the patent holder would have been re-
quired to post if patent holder had sought a stay pending appeal
D: Amount of under-compensation
E: Total payments by the patent holder made into the escrow be-
tween the district court decision and the Federal Circuit decision
From Figure 1, the expected cost for the patent holder of seeking
a stay pending appeal is:
(6) Cs= ps . (1-A) .B+ (1-p s) .pA.D
The first term on the right hand side in equation (6), pS. (1 - p)
B, is the expected value of the patent holder losing the bond it posted
if the patent holder obtained a stay pending appeal, but then lost the
appeal at the Federal Circuit. The second term in equation (6), (1 -
pS) .pa.D, is the expected under-compensation of the patent holder if
the patent holder was denied a stay pending appeal and the generic
entered the market after the district court decision, but the patent
holder then prevailed in the Federal Circuit.
From Figure 2, the expected cost for patent holder under the
interim agreement is:
(7) CA= (1-p) .E
Under the agreement, the only cost for the patent holder is the
loss of the escrow if it loses the appeal.
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Taking a difference between equations (6) and (7):
(8) Cs - CA= (I1-pA) . (p' . B -E) + (1- ps) . p4 .D
From equation (8), if the bond the patent holder is required to
post, B, is greater than its total escrow payment, E, then equation (8)
is greater than zero. This is true even if the patent holder can obtain a
stay pending appeal with certainty (i.e., if pS is equal to 1). That equa-
tion (8) is positive implies that it is more cost effective for the patent
holder to use the interim agreement to protect itself from the risk of
under-compensation, even if the patent holder can obtain a stay pend-
ing appeal with certainty. As shown in the Appendix, equation (8)
remains greater than zero if pS is less than 1, as long as the bond the
patent holder is required to post, B, is greater than its total escrow
payment, E.
In general, the posted bond should cover the profits the generic
could have made from its generic drug sales between the district court
decision and the Federal Circuit decision if the generic had entered
after the district court decision. In most cases, this figure can be esti-
mated, and compared to the size of the total escrow payment. There-
fore, given the existence of risk of under-compensation, a sufficient
condition for the interim agreement to be more cost effective than a
stay pending appeal is that the bond the patent holder would be re-
quired to post, B, is greater than its total escrow payment, E, and this
can be tested from observable information in any given case.
78
As this illustrative analysis suggests, an interim settlement agree-
ment can be more cost efficient than a stay pending appeal for the
patent holder to protect itself against the risk of under-compensation,
even if the patent holder is certain it would win a stay pending appeal.
Since most patent cases are settled, 79 settling patent disputes through
settlement agreements is typically viewed as a part of a patent holder's
right,80 and the parties involved are encouraged to settle the dispute
in the most efficient way. Accordingly, if an interim settlement agree-
ment is demonstrated likely to be more efficient than alternative for-
mal legal proceedings in any given case, then this is another reason
why the specific interim settlement agreement should fall within the
scope of a patent holder's patent right.
78. Because D is positive if there is risk of under-compensation, (4) can still be posi-
tive even if B is smaller than E.
79. See Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 4, at 1720.
80. We are not arguing that all patent settlements are within the scope of a patent
holder's patent right.
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Conclusion
The competitive implications of so called "reverse payments" in
patent litigation settlements in the pharmaceutical industry have
drawn a great deal of attention and have generated a number of arti-
cles in the last few years. The economics of these agreements are com-
plex and vary by the specific type of agreement and the facts each case
presents. There is disagreement over when these agreements, on bal-
ance, are anticompetitive and when they can improve overall con-
sumer welfare. Accordingly, these cases do not lend themselves to
extremely broad generalizations, nor should they be condemned as
per se illegal or virtually per se illegal. In this Article we have de-
scribed and developed some specific measurable tests for determining
when interim settlements with payments from a patent holder to a
would-be generic entrant can be justified by the potential for under-
compensation to the patent holder and when they cannot. Similarly
specific tests should be applied to other types of settlements involving
"reverse payments" before condemning such agreements.
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Appendix
Differentiate equation (8) with respect to pS:
(9) d(Cs- CA)
dp- B- 
D
The first term in equation (9), (1 - pi) - B, represents the ex-
pected premium the patent holder is paying to insure the expected
under-compensation, which is pA D, the second term in equation (9).
Since it is only in the holder's economic interest to post the bond if
the expected premium is smaller than the expected under-compensa-
tion, (8) should be less than or equal to zero.* This implies that (Cs -
CA) is a decreasing function of p. In other words, the smaller the pS is,
the larger the (Cs - CA) is. Since we know that when p5 is equal to 1,
(4) is greater than zero, as pS decreases, (Cs - CA) will increase. There-
fore, (Cs - CA) is always greater than zero, which implies that the in-
terim agreement is the more cost effective alternative than seeking a
stay pending appeal for a patent holder to protect itself from the risk
of under-compensation if as the bond patent holder is required to
post, B, is greater than its total escrow payment, E
* Given an estimate of under-compensation and the size of the bond a patent
holder is required to post, one can analyze under what conditions a patent holder will be
willing to post the bond to insure against the risk of under-compensation.
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